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I. Introduction
In this country, the freedom of testamentary disposition is one of the
basic tenets of our social structure. Even though the ability to dispose of
one's property by will is not a federally protected right,' the privilege of
testation is commonly considered a "right" fundamental to our form of
government. In fact, restrictions on the freedom of testation are usually
considered anathema both to private property rights and to the rights of
the individual. In view of this sentiment, the intent of the testator has
naturally played a dominant role in giving effect to his last wishes.
Nevertheless, despite judicial assertions to the contrary, 2 the testator
is not always permitted to dispose of his property as he sees fit. The
freedom of testation has always been tempered by notions of fairness,
justice, and especially morality.8 Since one needs to fulfill rather minimal
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law (formerly Delaware Law
School). A.B., Bowdoin College; M.M. in musicology, Manhattan School of Music; J.D., Delaware
Law School (Widener University School of Law). Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
The author wishes to thank Robert A. Grey, a Widener University School of Law student, for
research assistance of the highest caliber.
1 As Justice Jackson pointed out in Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942):
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased ... are of statutory creation, and the
dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids
the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.
Id at 562. On a state level, only Wisconsin recognizes a constitutional right of inheritance. See
Nunnemacher v. State, 1129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
2 "The right of testamentary disposition of one's property as an incident of ownership, is by law
made absolute. It is a valuable right, closely protected by statute and judicial opinion." In re Martison's Estate, 29 Wash. 2d 912, 913, 190 P.2d 96, 97 (1948).
3 See Every, Undue Influence-JudicialImplementation of Sodal Policy, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 569, 569.
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mental competency requirements in order to make a will, 4 courts frequently employ a variety of legal tools to protect the testator both from
the malevolent actions of others as well as from his own folly. 5 The doctrine of undue influence, in particular, is intended to serve as a protective
device to ensure that the wishes and choices of the testator are truly his
own and not those of some other person. 6 But, because it is often impossible for judges or juries to decide cases in a moral vacuum,7 the doctrine
often functions instead as a barometer of society's mores.
Nowhere is this tendency more prevalent than in those cases where
the testator has given a significant portion of his estate to a person with
whom he has had a meretricious relationship. 8 Although not always determinative, proof of a meretricious relationship is generally considered
quite relevant, at the very least, to the question of whether the testator
has been unduly influenced into making the gift. 9 In fact, when coupled
with a disposition which is considered unjust in light of those who are
usually deemed to be the natural objects of the testator's bounty, the
relationship often raises an inference of undue influence which the jury
may properly consider in deciding the case. 10 This is true even though
the testator definitely intended the disposition in question, and even
though there is really no indication that his testamentary wishes have
been compromised.
In the past, this view has been problematic from the perspective of
freedom of testation. On the one hand, the testator, for the most part,
has the privilege of selecting the beneficiaries of his estate. On the other
hand, society has an interest in ensuring that the testator is, in fact, mak4 It is a basic truism of estate law that one needs less mental capacity to execute a will than a
contract. This is reflected by the vague standard, "of sound mind," which many jurisdictions use to
describe the mental competence required to make a will. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2501
(1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 201 (1974); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1976).
5 For example, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, which often allows a second will
to stand despite its revocation, sometimes protects the testator from his own mistakes. Also, the
remedy of the constructive trust, by preventing unjust enrichment, often corrects the result of improper actions by others towards the testator.
6 See, e.g., In re Estate of Larendon, 216 Cal. App. 2d 14, 30 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (testator's will
held product of undue influence due to virtual duress).
7 See, e.g., Holland v. Traylor, 227 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1969) (meretricious relationship between
older woman and younger man held to unduly influence woman into making him a principal beneficiary under her will); In re Kaufmann's Will, 20 App. Div. 2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), aft'd, 15
N.Y.2d 825, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941, 205 N.E.2d 864 (1965) (homosexual relationship between two men
held to unduly influence one to will his estate to the other).
According to one study done some years ago, not only do juries find for the contestant in over
757 of will contests submitted to them, but trial judges rarely withdraw cases from their consideration, or interfere with jury verdicts. See Comment, Will Contests on Tial, 6 STAN. L. REv. 91 (1953).
See also Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958).
8 Although "meretricious" originally connoted purely illicit and tawdry sexual behavior ("characteristic of a prostitute"), the term, in legal parlance, refers to any unlawful sexual relationship. See
WEBSTER'S DicTONARY 1127 (2d ed. 1980); BLACK'S LAw DICrONARY 891 (5th ed. 1979). Within the
context of this article, however, the term "meretricious relationship" is used to signify a voluntary,
sustained sexual relationship between two persons which is not sanctified by lawful marriage. It thus
encompasses the sexual relationship between two unmarried cohabitants of the opposite or same
sex, as well as the term "meretricious spouse."
9 See infra notes 13-42 and accompanying text.
10 In a few jurisdictions, evidence of a meretricious disposition in light of the testator's familial
situation has even raised a presumption of undue influence. See, e.g., Snyder v. Erwin, 229 Pa. 644,
79 A. 124 (1911).
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ing a free choice. But, in light of the change in attitude towards meretricious relationships which has taken place in our society over the last
twenty years,' 1 the role which a meretricious relationship can play in determining undue influence in testamentary dispositions is both unrealistic and out of date. For instance, the number of "live-in" relationships
which exist in our society today hardly raises an eyebrow.1 2 In fact, in
light of the current mores of society, it makes far more sense to view
testamentary gifts based upon meretricious relationships as evidence of
the natural beneficence of the testator, rather than as evidence of undue
influence. It is perfectly reasonable that a testator would want to benefit
a person who had given him some measure of comfort, support, or happiness during his life, at the expense of family members who either had
ignored or acted badly towards him.
This Article argues that, where a testator has willed a significant portion of his property to someone with whom he has had a meretricious
relationship, the fact of the relationship, far from automatically serving as
some basis for a finding of undue influence, should instead be able to
serve equally well, at the very least, as proof that the beneficiary was indeed a natural object of the testator's bounty. The Article begins by investigating the attitude of courts regarding testamentary dispositions
resulting from meretricious relationships. It then examines recent developments in the area of domestic relations law in order to place the traditional view in a more modem, and perhaps proper, perspective. The
Article next analogizes this perspective to established norms and emerging trends in the areas of life insurance, entitlement, and tort law. Finally, a more realistic perception of testamentary gifts based upon
meretricious relationships is articulated that, when compared to the law
of other countries, solves the inherent conflict between freedom of testation and the doctrine of undue influence that inevitably arises whenever
"meretricious dispositions" are associated with influences that are considered undue.
II.

The Traditional View: Considerations of Undue Influence

The doctrine of undue influence traditionally played an important
role in those cases where there is evidence of a meretricious relationship
which preceded a testamentary gift to the surviving partner. This can
perhaps be explained, in part, by the original connotation of the word
"meretricious," which suggested less than scrupulous behavior. 13 "Un4
due" influence was naturally associated with unsavory conduct.'
11 Recently, an Episcopalian bishop even went so far as to indicate that sex outside of marriage
should be condoned under certain circumstances. See Ostling, Bishop Spong on Right and Wrong, TIME,
June 13, 1988, at 56.
12 Based upon 1986 census figures, over 2.2 million couples of the'opposite sex cohabited without marriage in the United States. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 412, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1986 (ADVANCE REPORT) 2, fig. 2.
13

See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1127 (2d ed. 1980).

14 Not so long ago, even a marriage between an elderly man and a young woman generated
suspicion. See In re Van Ness' Will, 78 Misc. 592, 606, 139 N.Y.S. 485, 498 (1912).
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Most courts reflected this viewpoint by emphasizing that, although
not determinative, 15 a meretricious relationship was entitled to some
weight in determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented to show
undue influence. 16 A few courts even went so far as to specify that a
rebuttable presumption of undue influence arose whenever the testator
willed his estate to a meretricious partner rather than to the natural objects of his bounty.17 Many more courts emphasized that such a relationship raised a significant suspicion of undue influence, which would be
closely scrutinized.' 8 In other words, the relationship was an important
factor to be considered by the jury, for this factor might well color other
15 Becausejudges were inevitably influenced by their own views on morality, many courts, even
within the same jurisdiction, used somewhat different standards in determining the weight to be
given evidence of an "illicit" relationship. Compare Central Trust Co. v. Boyer, 308 Pa. 402, 410, 162
A. 806, 809 (1932) with Allshouse v. Kelly, 219 Pa. 652, 654, 69 A. 88, 88 (1908).
If undue influence is found to exist at the time of the execution of the will, most courts will strike
those portions of the will which are the products of the influence, as long as the remaining provisions can still effectuate the intent and testamentary scheme of the testator. See Williams v.
Crickman, 81 111. 2d 105, 115, 405 N.E.2d 799, 803-04 (1980). Some courts, however, follow a
minority position, which invalidates the entire will if any portion of it is held to be the product of
undue influence. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 735, 30 S.W.2d
19, 21 (1930).
16 See, e.g., Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 588, 125 A. 512, 517 (1924).
17 For instance, in Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, 97 Colo. 421, 50 P.2d 542 (1935), the testator unlawfully cohabited with the principal beneficiary under his will. The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld
an instruction by the trial judge that such a relationship raised a presumption of undue influence:
The... intimacy of [the] meretricious relationship between a testator and a beneficiary who
is not related to him by blood or marriage usually assumes a clandestine form and, after the
testator's death, would almost invariably render such undue influence as results therefrom
incapable of proof except by the aid of the presumption which the instruction in question
undertakes to recognize.
Id. at 426, 50 P.2d at 544. See also Snyder v. Erwin, 229 Pa. 644, 647, 79 A. 124, 125 (1911).
This kind of presumption would normally be reserved for situations involving inter vivos transfers between meretricious partners, since the living are presumptively in greater need of protection
from their own actions than the dead. See Beatty v. Strickland, 136 Fla. 330, 334-35, 186 So. 542,
544 (1939); Leighton v. Orr, 44 Iowa 679, 689 (1876); Platt v. Elias, 186 N.Y. 376, 378-79, 79 N.E. 1,
2 (1906). See also Sellers v. Quails, 206 Md. 58, 71-73, 110 A.2d 73, 80 (1954). But see Price v. Reilly,
135 NJ. Eq. 555, 559, 39 A.2d 426, 428 (NJ. Ch. 1944), aff'd, 136 N.J. Eq. 400, 42 A.2d 271 (1945)
(immoral relationship between parties not sufficient in itself to raise a presumption that a conveyance was procured by undue influence).
In addition, such a presumption frequently arises in testamentary as well as inter vivos transactions whenever the donor makes a substantial gift to someone with whom he has stood in -a confidential relationship. See, e.g., Burns v. Lucich, 6 Ark. App. 37, 47, 638 S.W.2d 263, 269 (1982) (inter
vivos); Schmidt v. Schwear, 98 II. App. 3d 336, 342, 424 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1981) (testamentary);
Cadorette v. Cadorette, 147 Me. 79, 85-86, 83 A.2d 315, 318 (1951) (inter vivos); Meley v. DeCoursey, 204 Md. 648, 655, 106 A.2d 65, 68 (1954) (inter vivos); Hodges v. Hodges, 692 S.W.2d 361, 367
(Mo. App. 1985) (inter vivos); Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of NJ., 87 N.J. 163, 177, 432 A.2d 890,
897-98 (1981) (testamentary); and In re Faulks' Will, 246 Wis. 319, 360, 17 N.W.2d 423, 440 (1945)
(testamentary). Some courts, however, merely shift the burden of going forward with the evidence
onto the proponent. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 703-04 (Fla. 1971); In re
Reddaway, 214 Or. 410, 420, 329 P.2d 886, 890-91 (1958). Although confidential relationships,
which usually include an element of unequal bargaining power between the parties, can, of course,
include familial and intimate relationships, this article does not bring to issue meretricious relationships which are also confidential, since treatment of such relationships would be subsumed under
the law regarding confidential relationships. See, e.g., In re Moses, 227 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1969) (illicit
relationship between testatrix and attorney-beneficiary held to result in undue influence, despite
testatrix's consultation with independent counsel).
18 See, e.g., Arnault v. Arnault, 52 N.J. Eq. 801, 805, 31 A. 606, 608 (1895).
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circumstances with a significance they might not otherwise have had.1 9
The majority of courts in most jurisdictions, however, viewed evidence of
a meretricious relationship as a relevant fact to be considered in connection with any other fact or circumstance20 relative to the issue of whether a
will was procured by undue influence.
But squaring this generally adverse judicial attitude toward meretricious relationships with the customary definition of undue influence is
inherently problematic since the doctrine, in theory at least, normally
does not include an element of morality on the part of the testator. Instead, most definitions of undue influence usually focus on its coercive
element. For example, the influence must "destroy the testator's free
agency and substitute for his own another person's will,"' 2 1 or "subjugate

the mind of [the] testator to the wishes of the person exerting the influence" 2 2 at the time the will is made. Thus, undue influence must "oblige
[the testator] to make a disposition of his property which he would not
have made if left freely to act according to his own wishes and
pleasures." 23 As one court eloquently put it:
[U]ndue influence... mean[s] whatever destroys free agency and constrains the person whose act is under review to do that which is contrary to his own untrammelled desire. It may be caused by physical
force, by duress, by threats, or by importunity. It may arise from persistent and unrelaxing efforts in the establishment or maintenance of
conditions intolerable to the particular individual. It may result from a
more subtle conduct designed to create an irresistible ascendancy by
imperceptible means. It may be exerted either by deceptive devices or
by material compulsion without actual fraud. Any species of coercion,
whether physical, mental, or moral, which subverts the sound judgment and genuine desire of the individual, is enough to constitute undue influence. Its extent and degree is inconsequential so long as it is
sufficient to substitute the dominating purpose of another for the
2 4 free
expression of the wishes of the person signing the instrument.
19 Hyatt v. Wroten, 184 Ark. 847, 852, 43 S.W.2d 726, 728 (1931); Alford v.Johnson, 103 Ark.
236, 244, 146 S.W. 516, 420 (1912). See Glider v. Melinski, 238 Iowa 140, 147, 25 N.W.2d 379, 382
(1947).
20 See Locke v. Sparks, 263 Ala. 137, 140, 81 So. 2d 670, 673 (1955); Norton v. Clark, 253 Ill.
557, 570, 97 N.E. 1079, 1084 (1912); Porschet v. Porschet, 82 Ky. 93, 98 (1884); In re Dilios" Will,
156 Me. 508, 539, 167 A.2d 571, 587 (1960); Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 588-89, 125 A. 512,
517 (1924); Saxton v. Krumm, 107 Md. 393, 401, 68 A. 1056, 1058 (1908); Neill v. Bracket, 234
Mass. 367, 369, 126 N.E. 93, 94 (1920); In re Anna's Estate, 248 N.Y. 421, 162 N.E. 473 (1928); In re
Wertheimer's Estate, 286 Pa. 155, 165, 133 A. 144, 148 (1926); Holmes v. Houston, 241 S.W. 1039,
1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). See also In re Estate of Burkland, 8 Wash. App. 153, 158-59, 504 P.2d
1143, 1146 (1972).
Most of these viewpoints play a role in the famous case of In re Kaufmann, 20 A.D. 464, 247
N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y. 825, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941, 205 N.E.2d 864 (1965), in which a
wealthy and allegedly homosexual testator named his lover as the principal beneficiary under his
will. Two differentjuries found that the will had been procured by undue influence. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, held that the evidence sustained a finding of undue influence, exercised
over a period of several years, despite the fact that the testator had clearly expressed his last wishes
and his reasons therefor in a letter to his family. However, the court reached its result, in part, by
determining that the relationship between the two men was a confidential as well as meretricious
one. Id. at 486, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
21 In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 573, 575, 107 P.2d 25, 27 (1940).
22 Lindinger v. Lindinger, 126 Ind. App. 463, 466, 130 N.E.2d 75, 77 (1955).
23 Id
24 Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369, 126 N.E. 93, 94 (1920).
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Such all-embracing definitions allowed most courts to pay lip service
to the technically accurate assertion that testamentary gifts resulting
from meretricious relationships did not automatically result in a finding
of undue influence. In fact, courts often oversimplified the matter, by
making sweeping pronouncements about the ability of a testator to dispose of his property to whomever he pleased, regardless of the relationships involved. 25 Thus, according to many courts, undue influence did
not result from "the promptings of affection," ' 26 "the desire of gratifying
the wishes of another,"' 2 7 or from "the memory of kind acts and friendly
offices,"' 28 but from "a coercion produced by importunity, or by a silent
resistless power which the strong will often exercises over the weak...
which [can] not be resisted, so that the motive [of the testator is] tantamount to force or fear." 2 9 "[T]here must be more than mere influence or
persuasion because a person can be influenced to perform an act that is
nevertheless his voluntary action."3 0 These courts, in line with most
commentators, even postulated that, in theory, a testator could favor his
mistress over his wife or family,3 1 and that the unjustness of a will should
not enter into a determination of its validity.3 2 Mere persuasion, earnest
solicitation, or well-deserved influence over another were therefore insufficient to affect the validity of a will.3 3 All of this would seem to indicate that undue influence would not be a factor whenever natural
affection or the desire to please the wishes of a beloved were the principal motivations behind a testamentary gift.
In the application of these theoretical principles, however, courts
often ignored their own proclamations about the inherent nature of undue influence. For instance, one early opinion emphasized:
Lawful influence, such as that arising from legitimate family and social
relations, must be allowed to produce its natural results, even in influencing last wills. However great the influence thus generated may be,
it has no taint of unlawfulness in it; and there can be no presumption
of its actual unlawful exercise merely from the facts that it is known to
have existed, and that it has manifestly operated on the testator's mind
as a reason for his testamentary dispositions ....

But we should do

violence to the morality of the law, and therefore to the law itself, if we
should apply this rule to unlawful... relations[.] ... [W]here apparently used to obtain selfish advantages, they are regarded with deep
25 See Mangan v. Mangan, 554 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Mo. App. 1977).
26 In re Burke, 82 A.D.2d 260, 269,441 N.Y.S.2d 542, 548 (1981) (quoting In re Walter, 6 N.Y.2d
49, 53-54, 188 N.Y.S. 168, 159 N.E.2d 665 (1959)).
27 Id.
28 Id
29 Ide
30 In re Will of Coley, 53 N.C. App. 318, 320, 280 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1981).
31 See Reed v. Shipp, 293 Ala. 632, 639, 308 So. 2d 705, 710 (1975); T. ATxINSON, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF WILLS § 55, at 258 (2d ed. 1953). See also D. PARRY, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 10-11 (5th
ed. 1966).
32 In re McCauley, 101 Ariz. 8, 16, 415 P.2d 431, 439 (1966); Abel v. Dickinson, 250 Ark. 648,
652, 467 S.W.2d 154, 155 (1971); In re Dobson's Will, 258 Wis. 587, 588-89, 46 N.W.2d 758, 759-60
(1951).
33 See McClure v. Kerchner, 107 Okla. 28, 33, 229 P. 589, 594 (1924).
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suspicion; and it would be strange if unlawful relations should be more
favourably regarded.3 4
Other courts also followed this line of reasoning by indicating that
undue influence was more readily inferred in the case of a will made in
favor of a mistress than a wife. 35 Furthermore, a seemingly unfair, unjust, or unnatural disposition was indeed a relevant consideration in determining whether improper influence had been used. 36 In fact, a wide
range of evidence would be considered in order to ascertain whether a
will was procured by undue influence,3 7 since:
It is impossible to set forth all the various combinations of facts and
circumstances that are sufficient to make out a case of undue influence
because the possibilities are as limitless as the imagination of the
adroit and the cunning. The very nature of undue influence makes it
impossible for the law to
lay down tests to determine its existence with
mathematical certainty. 38

A major reason for the apparent disparity between the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine of undue influence and its practical application to testamentary dispositions involving meretricious relationships
is that most courts tend to focus on whether the alleged influence by the
beneficiary is deemed undue, instead of concentrating on whether the
testator has in fact been coerced into making the gift. Since the relationship which arises between meretricious partners is deemed to provide
favorable opportunities for the exertion of undue influence, proof of the
relationship becomes relevant in such cases. 39 Thus, whether the meretricious relationship is given weight in the determination of undue influence depends more on the attitude of the court towards the conduct in
question than on the application of generalized principles. And, because
most courts place more importance on the effect or result of the influence than on its actual cause, application of the doctrine often ignores
the basic element of coercion in undue influence. One court typified this
tendency well:
Rather than approach the problem from the standpoint of the testator's freedom of will, it would be more profitable to focus the emphasis on the nature of the influencer's conduct in persuading the testator
to act as he does. The question is, has the influencer by his conduct
gained an unfair advantage by devices which reasonable men regard as
34 Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 312, 317 (1862).
35 See Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184, 196-97, 51 N.E. 227, 231 (1898); Kessingerv. Kessinger, 37
Ind. 341, 343 (1873); In re Davis' Will, 172 Or. 354, 370-71, 142 P.2d 143, 149 (1943). See also 3 W.
PAGE, WILLS § 29.88, at 612-13 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961).

36 See Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 633, 666, 82 So. 236, 246 (1919); In re Reddaway's Estate, 214
Or. 410, 426, 329 P.2d 886, 892 (1958).
37 See Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 21 Ark. App. 112, 122, 730 S.W.2d 502, 507
(1980).
38 In re Will of Coley, 53 N.C. App. 318, 321, 280 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1981).
Those circumstances often considered important to a determination of undue influence include
whether the beneficiary participated in the preparation of the will, whether the decedent's attitude
towards the natural objects of his bounty underwent a sudden change, and whether the gift is
deemed to be unjust or unnatural. See In re Reddaway's Estate, 214 Or. 410, 416-17, 329 P.2d 886,
891-92 (1958).
39 See In re Kelly's Estate, 150 Or. 598, 618, 46 P.2d 84, 92 (1935).
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improper?... "The nature of the influence can be judged only by its
result. It is the end accomplished which colors the influence exerted
....
We are to understand the word 'undue' as describing not the
nature.., of the influence existing .... but as qualifying the purpose
with which it is exercised or the result which it accomplishes ..... ...
[T]he emphasis should be on the unfairness
of the advantage which is
40
reaped as the result of [the] conduct.
Many courts, and some commentators, have attempted to explain
away this tension between theory and practical application by suggesting
that undue influence is closer to fraud than to duress. 4 1 But this resolution conflicts with the usual definitions of undue influence, and allows
morality to play a large, and often inappropriate, role in determining undue influence. Thus, a certain amount of inattention to the basic thrust
of the doctrine has prevented most courts from analyzing proof of meretricious relationships connected with testamentary dispositions in any
way but a negative one. Indeed, very few courts have dealt with the problem from the more appropriate perspective of, and with an emphasis on,
the freedom of testation. As one court accurately explained:
A testator's favor expressed in a will may be won by devoted attachment, self-sacrificing kindness, and the beneficient ministrations of
friendship and love. These influences are not undue. We expect partiality to attend them. They bring preferment as their natural reward,
and they do not become unrighteous, although they establish a general ascendancy over the testator leading him to find comfort and pleasure in gratifying the wishes and desires of the person exercising them.
Other less worthy influences may make equally strong appeals and
may result in the same general dominion and still be sufferable in contemplation of the law. Influences to induce testamentary disposition
may be specific and direct without becoming undue. It is not improper
to advise, to persuade, to solicit, to importune, to entreat, and to implore. Hopes and fears and even prejudices may be moved. Appeals
may be made to vanity and to pride; to the sense ofjustice and to the
obligations of duty; to ties of friendship, of affection, and of kindred;
to the sentiment of gratitude; to pity for distress and destitution. It is
not enough that the testator's convictions be brought into harmony
with that of another by such means. His views may be radically
changed, but so long as he is not overborne and rendered incapable of
acting finally upon his own motives, so long as he remains a free agent,
his choice of a course is his own choice, and the will is his will and not
that of another.4 2
40 In re Reddaway's Estate, 214 Or. 410, 420, 329 P.2d 886, 890 (1958) (en banc) (citing Morris
v. Morris, 192 Miss. 518, 521, 6 So. 2d 311, 312 (1942)). See also In re Sessions, 217 Or. 45, 51, 341
P.2d 512, 517 (1959).
41 See, e.g., In re Reddaway's Estate, 214 Or. 410,420, 329 P.2d 886, 890 (1958) (en banc); Perr,
Wills, Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence, 9 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAw, 15, 16 (Mar.
1981).
42 Ginter v. Ginter, 79 Kan. 721, 726, 101 P. 634, 636 (1909):
It should be noted that not all courts followed the traditional approach to meretricious gifts.
Several select opinions have observed that it is difficult to base a finding of undue influence on the
testator's natural affection for someone with whom he has had an intimate relationship. See, e.g..
Parrisella v. Fotopulos, 111 Ariz. 4, 522 P.2d 1081 (1974); In re Ruffino's Estate, 116 Cal. 304, 316,
48 P. 127, 130 (1897); Monroe v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 317 (1867); In re Estate of Newkirk, 456
P.2d 104, 108 (Okla. 1969); Estate of Quenville, 220 Or. 159, 183, 347 P.2d 609, 619 (1959); Wainwright's Appeal, 89 Pa. 220, 226 (1879); In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 265, 248 P.2d 372, 376
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The Traditional View Outdated: The Changing Attitude Towards
Meretrious Relationships

It is difficult to dispute that the law's perception of immorality has
narrowed considerably over the past two decades. 43 Dramatic changes
have occurred in the law's general treatment of domestic relations matters, particularly in the constitutional, criminal, and family law areas. An
examination of such changes indicates that it is no longer appropriate to
view testamentary gifts resulting from meretricious relationships as evidence of undue influence.
For example, in 1972, the United States Supreme Court held that
the unmarried as well as the married have a right of access to contraceptives. 44 A year later, the Court decided that women have a constitutional
right to abortion during certain stages of pregnancy. 4 5 About the same
time, many states began to repeal criminal statutes for conduct previously considered immoral or illicit. Thus, in several jurisdictions, adultery and fornication are no longer considered crimes. 4 6 In addition,
numerous legislatures have recently enacted "no fault" divorce statutes. 4 7 Society's notion of what is "proper" or "moral" also changed a
great deal over the last few years. For instance, it is now routine to see
advertisements for feminine hygiene products, jock itch, and condoms
on national television-subjects previously considered unmentionable in
polite conversation.
The change in attitude is perhaps most striking when it comes to
cohabitation between unmarried partners, probably the most visible
form of meretricious relationship. The number of couples who cohabit
without marrying has increased rapidly over the last twenty years. The
latest census figures show that there are now well over two million un(1952); In re Estate of Bums, 23 Wis. 2d 175, 127 N.W.2d 239 (1964). See also In re Estate of Langlois, 361 Mich. 646, 106 N.W.2d 132 (1960); In re Swartz's Will, 79 Okla. 191, 194, 192 P. 203, 206
(1920).
43 See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1803, 1817 (1985).
44 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which was based in part upon Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (constitutional "zone of privacy" recognized). See also Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (states must refrain from regulating abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, and have only limited regulatory powers during the second
trimester).
46 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269a-269b (West 1970) (cohabitation and adultery) (repealed
1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 35 1-82-2 (Bums 1905) (adultery and fornication) (repealed 1976); IowA
CODE § 702 (1975) (adultery and fornication) (repealed 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.070

(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1942) (fornication) (repealed 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1551
(1954) (fornication) (repealed 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632:2 (1974) (deviate sexual relations)
(repealed 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:l10-1 (West 1969) (fornication) (repealed 1978); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 167.005, .015 (adultery, lewd cohabitation) (repealed 1971). See also State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (statute outlawing sodomy unconstitutional as applied to consensual acts of
adult persons of the opposite sex not married to each other). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, para. 118 (Smith-Hurd 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (West 1982).
47 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 102

(Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5 (West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104 (1987). See
generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1982).
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married couples living together in this country.4 8 To place the number
in some perspective, there were approximately 525,000 unmarried
couples living together in 1970, and approximately 1,350,000 couples
cohabitating in 1979. 4 9 Thus, conduct once considered unacceptable has
now become relatively commonplace, since few negative connotations
apply to the practice anymore.5 0 In fact, not only are states repealing
anti-fornication statutes, 5 ' but many jurisdictions have even started to
single parents living in various forms of
award child custody rights to
"meretricious" cohabitation.5 2
As the incidence of nonmarital cohabitation increased, the law began
to offer protection to cohabitants against various forms of discriminatory
treatment based upon the meretricious relationship. For example, one
jurisdiction held that a landlord may not refuse to rent to couples simply
because they are unmarried, 53 while another ruled that a municipal
worker's employment may not be terminated based upon the employee's
refusal to disclose information about his living arrangement with his mistress. 54 In like manner, an application for a mortgage loan under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act may not be denied solely because the applicants are unmarried cohabitants.5 5 Furthermore, nonmarital cohabitation may not be used as a criterion in determining the moral character of
an applicant to sit for the bar examination.5 6 Indeed, a few jurisdictions
have gone so far as to hold that state statutes which criminalize consensual sodomy or deviate sexual intercourse between persons not married
to each other, even of the same sex, are unconstitutional. 57 Because of
the social and legal change in attitude towards meretricious cohabitation,
48 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P20, No. 412, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, MARITAL STATUS, AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1986
Advance Report 2, fig. 2. See The Phila. Inquirer, May 13, 1988, at A-3. See also Fineman, Law and
Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275, 275 n.1;
Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J.
1829, 1831 n.12 (1987).
49 See Comment, Extending ConsortiumRights to UnmarriedCohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 911, 911
n.1 (1981).
50 The practice is favored not only among the young, but among the elderly as well, primarily for
pension and social security payment purposes. See Sussman, The Four F's of Variant Family Forms and
MarriageStyles, 24 FAMILY COORDINATOR 563, 575-76 (1975); Macklin, Heterosexual CohabitationAmong
UnmarriedCollege Students, 21 FAMILY COORDINATOR 463 (1972); Glendon, Marriage and the State: The
Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 686 (1976). One recent newspaper article even reported that the "happiness quotient" for the unmarried as compared to that for married couples has
risen substantially. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1988, at C-1. However, the practice is still not generally
accepted when it involves two partners of the same sex. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (state statute criminalizing consensual sodomy held constitutional as applied to
homosexuals).
51 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1892) (anti-fornication) (repealed 1983).
52 See, e.g., S. v.J., 81 Misc. 2d 828, 830, 367 N.Y.S.2d 405, 407-08 (Sup. Ct. 1975). Of course,
as early as 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) payments could not be denied to the children of mothers who were cohabiting with
able-bodied men. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
53 Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712
(1982).
54 Shuman v. City of Phila., 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
55 See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., Assocs., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
56 "See Cord v. Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
57 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). In light of Bowers v.
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many commentators are beginning to advocate new forms of marriage in
order to encompass the different types of emotional commitment possi58
ble in nonmarital living arrangements.
Nowhere is the trend in favor of a more expansive outlook on meretricious living arrangements more pronounced than in the law's relatively
recent recognition of the property rights of unmarried cohabitants. For
years, most courts refused to enforce agreements concerning the division
of property between unmarried cohabitants upon the termination of the
relationship (by death or otherwise) because such promises were deemed
to be based on immoral or illicit consideration.5 9 Some courts, however,
did recognize that meretricious partners could enter into valid express
contracts regulating their property rights, as long as there was some consideration independent of the illicit relationship itself.60 These courts
often purposely severed that portion of the agreement involving sex
from the remainder of the contract in order to enforce the bargain.
Gradually, other courts began to enforce understandings between meretricious couples relating to a division of their property based upon pooling, partnership, orjoint adventure agreements, or whenever there were
circumstances adequate to establish resulting or constructive trusts. 6 1
Later on, some courts also began to recognize property rights between
62
cohabitants based upon implied agreements.
This progression eventually culminated in the landmark decision of
Marvin v. Marvin,63 in which the Supreme Court of California, in dictum,
concluded that courts should enforce not only express contracts between
unmarried cohabitants, but also should employ the doctrines of implied
contract, quantum meruit, and other equitable remedies to achieve a fair
division and distribution of cohabitants' property, 64 based on the preHardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), these decisions have questionable validity. Even so, they illustrate a change in perception towards one type of meretricious relationship.
58 In this regard, see Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 441 (1976); Glendon,
Modern MarriageLaw and its Underlying Assumptions: The New Marriageand the New Property, 13 FAM. L.Q.
441 (1980); Reppy, Property and Support Rights of UnmarriedCohabitants: A Proposalfor Creating a New
Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677 (1984).
59 This line of reasoning was sometimes called the meretricious spouse rule. See, e.g., Stevens v.
Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d
307 (193 1); Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70
A.2d 207 (1950); In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 96 P. 684 (1908); Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38
N.W.2d 12 (1949). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 589 (1932).
60 See, e.g., Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 460, 247 P.2d 19, 20 (1952); Lovinger v.
Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 243 P.2d 561 (Cal. App. 1952); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215
Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932) (en banc); Baxter v. Wilburu, 172 Md. 160, 162-63, 190 A. 773, 774
(1937); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 597 (1932); 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1476, at 622 (1962).
61 See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943); Garcia v. Venegas,
106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 84 (1951); Williams v. Payne, 515 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1974);
Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), overruled, In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101
Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984) (attempting to eliminate the unpredicable nature of the rule in
Creasman while making ajust and equitable disposition of property to a meretricous partner). See also
Comment, Illicit Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Keene Cases on the Rights of the Meretricious
Spouse, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 354 (1973).

62
63
64

See, e.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
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sumption that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other.65 Of particular importance was the court's attitude towards the denial ofjudicial
relief for cohabitants based only upon moral grounds:
[W]e believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modem society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time
when our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the socalled meretricious relationship.... [T]he nonenforceability of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the
fact that such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the nonmarital relationship of today to
is to do violence to an accepted and wholly difsuch a subject matter
66
ferent practice.
Currently, many jurisdictions follow the Marvin rationale, or parts
thereof, and recognize claims of cohabitants based upon express contracts, 6 7 implied contracts, 68 or other equitable remedies.6 9 In addition,
one jurisdiction attempts to regulate agreements between unmarried
cohabitants by statute,7 0 while another deems cohabitation after three
years a legal marriage.7 1 Finally, many commentators have attempted to
Id., 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. As the Marvin court stated:
We conclude that the judicial barriers [to] ... the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations
of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed .... [Eixpress agreements
will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration. We add that in
the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of other remedies in
order to protect the parties' lawful expectations.
Id., 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. See also Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin, Preserving the
Options, 65 CAL. L. REv. 937 (1977); Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of UnmarriedCohabitation, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1708 (1977).
66 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. It is important to note that Marvin
was not the first case to embody the change in the law's attitude towards the enforcement of agreements between meretricious couples. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carey, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (1973); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974); Latham v. Latham, 274
Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1975); Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 553-55, 554 P.2d 1057, 105960 (1976). See also Olson, In re Marriage of Carey: The End of the Putative-MeretriciousSpouse Distinction
in California, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 436 (1975). Nevertheless, the Marvin decision marked a turning
point in society's recognition and acceptance of the legal rights of unmarried cohabitants, in part
because of the extensive press coverage surrounding the case at the time of the decision. The case
has continued to inspire numerous commentaries over the years. For further discussion, see Casad,
UnmarriedCouples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47
(1978); Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L.
REV. 1039 (1978); Comment, The Enforcement of CohabitationAgreements: Theories of Recovery for the Meretricious Spouse, 61 NEB. L. REV. 138 (1982); Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARO.. L.
REV. 389 (1982).
67 See Poe v. Levy, 411 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md.
App. 217, 443 A.2d 121 (1982); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 702, 301 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1981);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 NJ. 378, 384, 403 A.2d 902, 908 (1979); Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d
481, 488, 407 N.E.2d 438, 441, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1980); McCall v. Frampton, 81 A.D.2d 607,
608, 438 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (1981); Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553 (1983).
68 See Carroll v. Lee, 148 Ariz. 10, 14, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (1986); Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 678
P.2d 672 (1984).
69 See Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C. App. 1984); In re Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671,
673-74 (Minn. 1983); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977); McCullon v. McCullon,
96 Misc. 2d 962, 969-71, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 231-32 (1978); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507
(1978) (en banc); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 529, 534, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313, 315 (1987); In re
Estate of Steffes, 95 Wis. 2d 490, 498, 290 N.W.2d 697, 705 (1980).
70 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West Supp. 1988).
71 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1983).
Not all jurisdictions have followed the Marvin trend. In fact, a few states refuse to recognize any
legal claims based upon cohabitation without marriage. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 542,
65
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formulate comprehensive new legal rights based upon the practice of co72
habitation without marriage.
In light of the many changes which have taken place in how domestic
relations law treats meretricious relationships, and especially nonmarital
cohabitation, which is perhaps the archetypal meretricious relationship
within the context of this article, it no longer is fitting to view a meretricious relationship as inherently relevant, as a matter of course, in determining whether undue influence has been exercised in the making of a
testamentary gift to the surviving partner of the relationship. Inasmuch
as meretricious relationships have achieved a more accepted and legitimate status in the eyes of the law, and that various legal rights have begun to attach to such unions, courts have less and less justification for
deeming the influence which results from the relationships as necessarily
undue. Clearly, the traditional rationale which most courts follow in
such situations is now outdated, since the "immorality" of the testator is
no longer an appropriate consideration in such cases. In addition, the
recognition of existing property rights during life militates against a denial of such rights upon death. Interestingly enough, the change in attitude towards most sexual relationships between consenting adults allows
the element of coercion more easily to play its rightful role in determining whether undue influence is involved in a testamentary gift, without
regard to the morality of the previous relationship between the testator
and the beneficiary. This, in turn, permits the freedom of testation to be
the focus whenever undue influence is alleged in the making of a testamentary gift.
IV. Reasoning by Analogy
The viewpoint that a testamentary gift which results from a meretricious relationship between the testator and the beneficiary should not be
viewed exclusively as evidence of undue influence also receives support
when analogized to established principles and recent developments in
the areas of life insurance, entitlement, and tort law. In these fields, certain kinds of property claims are generally permitted regardless of the
relationships involved, while an increasing number of legal claims, traditionally based upon spousal status, are beginning to succeed when based
upon nonmarital, meretricious relations as well. In other words, the ability to sue to protect a property or spousal interest in the event of injury
or death to the other party is increasingly being recognized for meretricious partners or nonmarital cohabitants. The growing recognition of
238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1977) (cohabitation constitutes immoral consideration preventing cohabitant
from recovery); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Il1. 2d 49, 66, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (1979) (public policy
prevents enforcement of property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants); Estate of Alexander
v. Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1984) (woman's services not recognized for purposes of property division between unmarried cohabitants). Other courts still pick and choose which claims to
allow, based upon their own notions of morality. See, e.g.,Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1206 (1984).
72 See, e.g., Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposalfor Dividing the Property of Unmarried
Families, 12 WILLIAMETrE L. REv. 453 (1976). See also Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation
Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1985).
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these types of claims indicates that it now makes little sense to infer undue influence as a matter of course whenever meretricious relationships
result in testamentary gifts to the surviving partner.
A.

Life Insurance Claims

Under ordinary life insurance policies most courts hold that the
existence of a meretricious relationship between the insured and the
beneficiary is not a relevant consideration in determining the rights of
the parties under the insurance contract. Thus, an insured may name his
mistress or cohabitant as beneficiary, and the designated individual may
recover the insurance proceeds upon the insured's death, regardless of
the prior relationship between the two. 73 Even a false statement as to the
relationship which exists between an insured and his beneficiary does not
necessarily vitiate the policy, and preclude recovery. 74 In addition, a majority of courts rule that, within the context of life insurance contracts,
meretricious relationships between the insured and the beneficiary are
not per se confidential, and therefore no presumption of undue influence
arises in such cases. 7 5 Then, too, under certain circumstances, common
law spouses are generally permitted to recover the proceeds of life insurance policies, even though the insured partner has designated the other
as his legal spouse on the policy. 7 6 From a functional viewpoint, there
seems to be little difference between common law marriage and sustained nonmarital cohabitation. 7 7 Furthermore, many jurisdictions,
which ostensibly do not recognize common law marriage, have recently
allowed Marvin-type property claims to prevail. 7 8 It is also interesting to
note that the National Service Life Insurance Act, which originally permitted a veteran to designate only a spouse or immediate blood relative
as a beneficiary under a service policy, was later amended to allow the
insured to name anyone at all as a beneficiary, including a "sweet73 See Quinton v. Millican, 196 Ga. 175, 179, 26 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1943); Cook v. Pullman Co.,
321 Ill. App. 302, 53 N.E.2d 55 (1944); Succession of Bankston, 166 So. 900, 901 (La. Ct. App.
1936); Shepard v. Espy, 142 N.E.2d 238, 241-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); Moore v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
74 Ohio App. 420, 422, 59 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1944). See also Rakestraw v. City of Cincinnati, 69 Ohio
App. 504, 44 N.E.2d 278 (1942).
74 See Jackson v. Continental Casualty Co., 412 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1982); Gibson v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 183 Misc. 678, 50 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1944); Hendricks v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 149 Pa. Super.
350, 352, 27 A.2d 261, 261 (1942). See also Matthews v. Stroud, 239 Ala. 687, 196 So. 885 (1940).
But see Strachan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 321 Mass. 507, 73 N.E.2d 840 (1947) (earlier rule).
75 See Tracy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 34 Del. Ch. 207, 220, 101 A.2d 321,328 (1953); Smith
v. Hinton, 349 So. 2d 510, 512 (Miss. 1977). See also Goodale v. Wilson, 134 Me. 358, 186 A. 876
(1936). But see Benner v. Pederson, 143 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (minority rule).
76 See Redlinger v. Youle, 321 P.2d 509, 157 Cal. App. 2d 596 (1958); Jackson v. Smith, 703
S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App. 1985); Proctor v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 714 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1986). See
also Jackson v. Continental Casualty Co., 412 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1982).
77 See Weyrauch, Informal and FormalMarriage-AnAppraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U.
CHI. L. REv. 88, 93, 102 (1960). A common law marriage customarily requires that the parties consummate an agreement to marry, followed by a period of sustained cohabitation. Of course, it is
virtually impossible to prove the agreement to marry.
78 See supra notes 67-69; F. KUCHLER, LAW OF ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE 3 (2d ed. 1978);
Weyrauch, supra note 77, at 104-08. See also Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the
Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEo. L.J. 1829, 1831 n. 11, 1846 (1987). Putative spouses have
also been allowed to recover life insurance proceeds. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.
1975); infra note 82.
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heart." 79 Since one can designate a meretricious partner as a beneficiary
under an ordinary life insurance policy without any inference of undue
influence, it is difficult to justify why such an inference should operate
when making a gift by will. After all, both an insured and a testator are
equally at risk of undue influence. Moreover, the living may well be considered in greater need of protection from their own actions than the
dead.8 0
B.

Entitlement Claims

Although applications for spouse's death benefits under the Social
Security Act normally must be based on a strict status relationship of
legal spouse, as determined by state intestacy statutes, 8 ' putative, good
faith spouses 2 may also recover such benefits under certain circumstances. 83 Significantly, at least one jurisdiction has virtually abolished
the distinction between putative and meretricious spouses, at least for
purposes of intestate and testate succession, where the meretricious relationship is sustained and familial in nature.8 4 In addition, under the law
of those states which recognize common law marriage, common law
spouses are frequently permitted to recover survivor's benefits as well.8 5
More importantly, under the recently enacted Supplemental Security Income Title of the Social Security Act, meretricious relationships, under
certain circumstances, appear to qualify as spousal relationships in determining public assistance payments to aged, blind, and disabled adults.8 6
This blurring of distinction between spousal and meretricious relationships may be a portent of the future in deciding the property rights of a
surviving meretricious spouse under other provisions of the Act.
79 See National Serv. Life Ins. Act of 1940, 38 U.S.C. §§ 716, 717 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Compare United States v. Hoffman, 129 F. Supp. 580 (D.NJ. 1955); Batts v. United States, 120 F.
Supp. 26 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Morton v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Pa. 1950), with Morris v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Tex. 1963). See also Rombauer, MaritalStatus and Eligibilityfor
Federal Statutory Income Benefits: A HistoricalSurvey, 52 WASH. L. REV. 227, 231-56 (1977).
80 On the other hand, one can argue that the doctrine of undue influence serves as a protective
device for the testator, since one needs less mental capacity to execute a will than a contract.
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1982) (spousal status determined by reference to state law regarding devolution of intestate personal property). See also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979)
(restriction of "mother's insurance benefits" to widows and divorced wives of wage earners not a
denial of equal protection). Despite Califano, several suits have been brought by meretricious
spouses to recover mother's insurance benefits. Thus far, none has been successful. See, e.g., Young
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 787 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1986); Chambers v. Harris, 687 F.2d
332 (10th Cir. 1982).
82 Several states have adopted "putative marriage" statutes, which confer the rights of a legal
spouse upon those who in good faith believe their marriage to be valid, even though legally void.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-111 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 305 (Smith-Hurd 1980);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 117 (West 1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (West Supp. 1988); MONT.

CODE ANN. § 40-1-404 (1987). See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 209 (1987).
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1982); Aubrey v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957);
Kimball v. Folsom, 150 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. La. 1957).
84 See In re Estate of Atherly, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
85 See, e.g., Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986); Orr v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 1510 (D.
Nev. 1986). See supra text accompanying note 77. See also Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284 (11 th Cir.
1983).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (1983).
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C. Tort Claims
In the area of tort law, meretricious couples are beginning to prevail
when bringing suits to protect a spousal interest in the event of injury or
death to the other partner due to the negligence of a third party. Certain
trends are emerging which indicate that the rights of spouses are gradually being extended to nonmarital couples, particularly in actions for loss
of consortium, negligent infliction of emotional distress, worker's compensation, and wrongful death.
With respect to loss of consortium claims, courts have gradually expanded the boundaries of the tort action to include not only the husband
as claimant,8 7 but the wife as well.8 8 In addition, some courts extend the
right to sue for loss of consortium to parents for the loss of their child's
society and companionship. 89 More to the point, two courts recently
granted loss of consortium rights to unmarried cohabitants as an incident
of their cohabitational status. 90 Both courts reasoned that a member of a
nonmarital relationship can suffer identical damage to that suffered by a
spouse whose mate is injured. 9 ' Two other courts also recognized the
legitimacy of claims by cohabitants for loss of consortium. 9 2 Not surprisingly, common law spouses fairly routinely are permitted to sue for loss
of consortium. 9 3 Finally, several commentators argue that the time has
94
come to recognize consortium rights for unmarried cohabitants.
Some courts, however, refused to follow a rule granting recovery to
meretricious partners in the loss of consortium area, in part because of
the difficulties of proof involved in determining the stability and-durability of the relationships involved. 9 5 - However, the question of whether a
87 See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1923). A discussion of the historical underpinnings for a husband's right to recover for loss of consortium can be
found in Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
88 See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled, Smither and Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957)
(Smither overruled Hitaffer as applied to other circumstances); Comment, ExtendingConsortium Rights to
UnmarriedCohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 911, 917 nn.37-38 (1981).
89 See, e.g., Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975) (dictum);
Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975). But see Shattuck v. Gulliver, 40 Conn.
Supp. 95, 481 A.2d 1110 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972);
Beyer v. Murray, 33 A.D.2d 246, 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970).
90 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139
Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983). Although Butcher has recently been overruled by Elden
v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988) (en banc), a strong dissent maintained that the
majority opinion was short-sighted and not in step with the realities of modern living arrangements.
Id. at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
91 The Butcher court also required that the nonmarital relationship be both stable and significant
in order to qualify as a parallel to the marital relationship. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 188 Cal.
Rptr. at 512.
92 See Norman v. General Motors Corp., 628 F. Supp. 702 (D. Nev. 1986); Grant v. Avis Rent A
Car Sys., Inc., 158 Cal. App. 3d 813, 204 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1984).
93 See Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1986); Etienne v. DKM Enter., Inc., 136 Cal. App.
3d 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982); supra text accompanying note 77. See also Laws v. Griep, 332
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1983).
94 See, e.g., Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried Time for a Reappraisal, 15 FAM. L.Q. 223
(1981); Comment, supra note 88.
95 See Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 637-38, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 820 (1985) (refusing
to follow Butcher); Lewis v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 569, 220 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1986)
(refusing to follow Butcher); Hendrix v. General Motors Corp., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr.
922 (1983) (refusing to follow Butcher); See also Sykes v. Zook Enter., Inc., 215 N.J. Super. 461, 521
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meretricious relationship is stable and durable could be a question of fact
for the jury to decide. Several courts also declined to adopt such a rule
because of an official public policy favoring marriage over nonmarital cohabitation. 9 6 In light of the increasing number of nonmarital relationships in our society,9 7 however, public policy may eventually have to yield
to practical reality.
There has been a similar, and perhaps more compelling, progression with regard to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In
the late sixties and early seventies, several courts began to hold that one
need not be within a "zone of danger" 9 8 in order to sue for emotional
distress generated by witnessing the negligent infliction of a tortious injury on an immediate family member, including a spouse. 99 Later, a few
courts went somewhat further, and suggested that the absence of a blood
relationship between the victim and the plaintiff did not necessarily bar
recovery. 10 0 More significantly, two courts recently allowed unmarried
cohabitants to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress based upon injury to the other partner, as long as the meretricious relationship is a sustained or familial one.' 0
A.2d 1380 (Law Div. 1987); Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 445 A.2d 45 (App.
Div. 1982) (refusing to follow Bulloch).
96 See Weaver v. Searle, 558 F. Supp. 720, 723 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Gonzales v. Hudson, 200 Cal.
App. 3d 45, 245 Cal. Rptr. 753, superceded, 755 P.2d 355, 248 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. 1988) (in bank);
Elden v. Sheldon, 164 Cal. App. 3d 745, 210 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1985), vacated, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d
582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977);
Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md. App. 484, 473 A.2d 947 (1984); Haas v. Lewis, 8 Ohio App. 3d
136, 456 N.E.2d 512 (1986). See also Kiesel v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 638 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Haw.
1986).
97 It is interesting to note that quite a few courts have permitted married partners to recover for
loss of consortium even though they were not married at the time of the injury. See Sutherland v.
Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Stahl v. Nugent, 212 N.J. Super.
340, 514 A.2d 1367 (Law Div. 1986); Orga v. Pittsburgh Rys., 155 Pa. Super. 82, 85, 38 A.2d 391,
392 (1944). But see Curry v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 577 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Chiesa v.
Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 455 F. Supp.
168 (D. Minn. 1978); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980); Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J.
Super. 591, 444 A.2d 1141 (Law Div. 1982); Rademacher v. Torbensen, 257 A.D. 91, 13 N.Y.S.2d
124 (1939).
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
99 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc); Barnhill v.
Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Portee v.Jaffee, 84 NJ. 88,
417 A.2d 521 (1980); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1970); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). See also
Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982). But see Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12
(1969).
100 See Keck v.Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 116, 593 P.2d 668, 670, vacated, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d
668 (1979); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582-83, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726-27
(1976); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 410, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974).
101 See Garcia v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 397, 215 Cal. Rptr. 189, 193 (1985); Ledger v.
Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 646, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1985) overruled, Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. 1988) (in bank). Although both cases were recently overruled, Garcia
implicitly, Ledger explicitly, the three decisions indicate that a heated debate is taking place as to
whether courts should grant relief for such claims. See also Binns v. Fredendall, 32 Ohio St. 3d 244,
513 N.E.2d 278 (1987) (girlfriend directly involved in accident permitted to recover for mental distress caused by witnessing death of her boyfriend). But see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168
Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980); Ferretti v. Weber, 513 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). See also Roman v.
Carroll, 127 Ariz. 398, 621 P.2d 307 (1980) (no recovery for witnessing death of dog).

1989] TESTAMENTARY GIFTS RESULTING FROM MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 217

In the worker's compensation area, several state statutes determine
eligibility for death benefits by whether the surviving partner is "dependent" on the deceased employee for support at the time of his death. 0 2
Under such statutes, many courts hold that actual dependency can include that which arises from meretricious cohabitation.10 3 Moreover, in
some states, putative spouses may recover death benefits, 0 4 as may common law spouses.1 0 5 Furthermore, several commentators argue that
worker's compensation death benefits should be available to all survivors
of the deceased employee who qualify as actual dependents, regardless
106
of their prior relationship with the deceased.
Finally, although most wrongful death statutes usually base recovery
by a claimant on the claimant's status as an intestate heir or blood relative of the decedent, 0 7 which, of course, would exclude a meretricious
spouse, 0 8 one jurisdiction determines eligibility for recovery on the basis of dependency. 109 This appears to include a nonmarital partner."l 0
In addition, putative spouses may recover for wrongful death in some
jurisdictions,"' while a few others appear to recognize a common law
102 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510b (Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (Supp. 1988);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-290 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-65 (1987).
103 See Department of Indus. Relations, Div. of Indus. Accidents v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 94 Cal. App. 3d 72, 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979); Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So.
2d 1031 (La. 1978); Kendall v. Housing Auth., 196 Md. 370, 76 A.2d 767 (1950); West v. BartonMalow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 230 N.W.2d 545, reh 'g denied, 395 Mich. 902, 232 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
On the other hand, many workers' compensation statutes restrict claimants to members of a
predetermined class, such as legal spouses or blood relatives. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. ,§ 22-3-3-20
(Bums 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-46 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.59 (Andrson,1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 632 (1987). Courts tend to construe these types of provisions strictly. See In
re Reichert, 95 Idaho 647, 516 P.2d 704 (1973); Norrington v. Charles E. Cannell Co., 383 S.W.2d
137 (Ky. 1964); Lavoie v. International Paper Co., 403 A.2d 1186 (Me. 1979);Jones v. D. Canale &
Co., 652 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. 1983). See also Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
104 See Williams v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 670 P.2d 453, 455 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Parkinson
v.J. & S. Tool Co., 64 NJ. 159, 313 A.2d 609 (1974); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3503 (West 1971). See also
Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 45-48 (1985). See supra note 82.
105 See Biggie v. Northern Distrib. Co., I1 A.D.2d 591, 200 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1960); Bowlin v. State
Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 81 Or. App. 527, 726 P.2d 1186 (1986); Rager v.Johnstown Traction Co.,
184 Pa. Super. 474, 134 A.2d 918 (1957); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.226 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 77.
106 See, e.g., Davis, Dependency in Workmen's Compensation: Letting the Expectations and Conduct of Affected PartiesPlay a More Significant Role, 23 VAND. L. REV. 23 (1969). See generally 2 A. LARSON, THE
LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 63.40 (1987).
107 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-313 (Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.

ch. 229, § I (West 1985);

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-4 (West 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.20.020 (1988). See also Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Death Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761
(1982).
108 See Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1980); Matuz v. Geradin
Corp., 192 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 228 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1986); Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625,
210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1985); Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1982); Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981);
Sykes v. Propane Power Corp., 224 NJ. Super. 686, 541 A.2d 271 (App. Div. 1988).
109 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976).
110 Interestingly, in this context, most jurisdictions hold that the right to bring suit for wrongful
death accrues at the time of the victim's death, even though the deceased was not married at the time
of the injury. See, e.g., Lovett v. Garvin, 232 Ga. 747, 208 S.E.2d 838 (1974); Radley v. Le Ray Paper
Co., 214 N.Y. 32, 108 N.E. 86, reh'g denied, 214 N.Y. 688, 108 N.E. 1106 (1915).
111 See Kunakoffv. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 59, 332 P.2d 773 (1958); King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d
366 (La. 1975); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2
(Smith-Hurd 1977); supra note 82.
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spouse's right of recovery as well. 1 2 However, because wrongful death
is a creature of statute, and because legislatures are slow to institute reform in the tort area,' l' it is not surprising that wrongful death actions
are generally limited to surviving spouses or blood relatives. Then, too,
wrongful death actions, unlike those of worker's compensation, are not
based upon the decedent's original property rights, but on the survivor's
right to compensation for the decedent's death. This may also explain,
in part, why many legislatures treat the two types of actions differently.
Of course, in light of iMarvin, an eventual expansion of the permissible
class of claimants for wrongful
death seems quite possible, perhaps using
114
a pure dependency test.
V.

A Contemporary Approach to Testamentary Gifts Resulting From
Meretricious Relationships
Thus, the traditional view that the existence of a meretricious relationship between a testator and a beneficiary is, at the very least, a fact to
be considered in determining undue influence conflicts with contemporary notions of morality, as well as with established norms and recent
developments in other areas of the law. Indeed, the inherent premise of
the traditional view is no longer viable, since society's conception of morality and the rights of meretricious couples has expanded so radically
over the past few years. The customary view is also at odds with common
sense and practical reality. After all, it seems perfectly natural that a testator would want to reward someone with whom he has had a sustained,
intimate relationship.
The equally viable, if not more realistic, perspective from which to
view "meretricious gifts" is that proof of a voluntary, sustained sexual
relationship between the testator and the beneficiary should raise a reasonable inference that the beneficiary was a natural object of the testator's bounty. In other words, evidence of a meretricious relationship
should point to natural beneficence rather than suspicion or undue
influence.
In the past, most courts, when dealing with testamentary gifts to
meretricious partners, focused on to whom the gift was made, and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom, instead of concentrating primarily on
why the gift was made, which is the central question in undue influence
cases. Only an approach which views the meretricious partner as a natural object of the testator's bounty resolves the inherent tension between
the doctrine of undue influence and the freedom of testation, by allowing
courts to focus on the element of coercion in the application of the doctrine. A testator should have the right to dispose of his property to
whomever he pleases, as long as he does not ignore his legal obligations.
Thus, courts should not interfere with the testator's dispository scheme
112 See, e.g., Dupre v. Rochester Ropes, Inc., 216 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Chivers v. Couch
Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Hastie v. Rodriguez, 716 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986); Shelton v. Belknap, 275 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); supra text accompanying
note 77. But see In re Estate of Gonzalez, 43 Or. App. 393, 602 P.2d 1132 (1979).
113 See Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 245-46 (1959).
114 See also Blakesley, supra note 104, at 45.
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unless there is proof that the testator's will has in fact been compromised. After all, undue influence is not a rule of construction which can
be used to effectuate certain policies which courts deem advisable.
In terms of effectuating the testator's intent, this viewpoint is undoubtedly the more accurate. Under this approach, a meretricious relationship certainly could result in the exercise of undue influence.
However, the relationship, itself, could not be used as a gloss to cover a
lack of evidence of any real improper influence on the testator. Instead,
true coercion would have to be proved in order to invalidate the will or
parts thereof.
Such an approach to meretricious gifts is bolstered by those courts
which have held that putative, 1 5 common law,11 6 and even meretricious
spouses 1 7 can inherit under the laws of intestate succession. From a
functional viewpoint, a meretricious relationship which is sustained or
familial differs very little from a spousal relationship. It thus makes little
sense to differentiate between them, except on public policy grounds.
Public policy, however, may have to yield to the realities of modem living
arrangements.
Some countries already integrate meretricious relationships into
their legal institutions. For example, France recognizes the union libre, or
free union, which is similar to marriage, except that the parties are permitted to initiate and terminate the relationship at will, without legal formalities. 18 Sweden, too, acknowledges the social status ofsammanboende,
or living together, as an alternative to marriage." 19 In addition, several
Latin American countries, such as Cuba, 120 Venezuela, 12 1 Bolivia, 12 2 and
Panama,123 all have legal institutions in place that recognize relationships
between nonmarital or meretricious couples and the property rights of
the parties arising therefrom. Interestingly, Puerto Rico treats meretricious relationships very liberally as well, and makes meretricious spouses
115 See, e.g., In re Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974); Sousa v.
Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970); In re Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19
Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962); Mazzenga v. Rosso, 87 Cal. App. 2d 790, 197 P.2d 770 (1948); In re Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1984); In re Brenchley's Estate, 96 Wash. 223, 164 P.
913 (1917).
116 See, e.g.,Jennings v.Jennings, 20 Md. App. 369, 315 A.2d 816 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 14 N.J.
Super. 501, 82 A.2d 465 (Ch. Div. 1951); Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451
(1950); In re Stauffer's Estate, 372 Pa. 537, 94 A.2d 726 (1953); In re Glasco, 619 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981); In re Gallagher's Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 512, 213 P.2d 621 (1950).
117 See In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975). See also In re Estate
of Black, 160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984).
118 See 2 G. MARTY & P. RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 415 (1967). See also Lorio, Concubinage and its
Alternatives: A Proposalfor a More Perfect Union, 26 Loy. L. REV. 1, 22 (1980). Indeed, Planiol even
states that, at one point in French law, a concubine was allowed to recover for damages caused by the
wrongful death of her lover. See 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE §§ 868, 868A (La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1959). See also M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 85 (1977).
119 See M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 100 (1977). See also Lorio, supra note 118, at 22.
120 See CUBAN CoNsT. art. 43, para. 6. See also Arraros, Concubinange in Latin America, 3J. FAM. L.
330 (1963); Le Riverend-Brusone, Anomalous Marriages, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 481 (1956).
121 See Arraros, supra note 120, at 338 (quoting CODE OF VENEZUELA art. 767).
122 See BOLIVIAN CONsT. art. 194. See also Arraros, supra note 120, at 336.
123 See PANAMANIAN CONST. art. 53. See also Arraros, supra note 120, at 336.
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specifically eligible for certain legal benefits ordinarily reserved to legal
spouses elsewhere.;24
English law has long recognized that the existence of a meretricious
relationship between a testator and a beneficiary should not play a role in
determining undue influence. As one probate court explained early on:
[A] young man may be caught in the toils of a harlot, who makes use of
her influence to induce him to make a will in her favour, to the exclusion of his relatives. It is unfortunately quite natural that a man so
entangled should yield to that influence and confer large bounties on
the person with whom he has been brought into such relation; yet the
law does not attempt to guard against those contingencies. A man
may be the companion of another, and may encourage him in evil
courses, and so obtain what is called an undue influence over him, and
the consequence may be a will made in his favour. But that again,
shocking as it is, perhaps
even worse than the other, will not amount
25
to undue influence. 1
This line of reasoning was later reflected, to some extent, in the Administration of Estates Act of 1925,126 which permitted the Crown to
provide for dependents of the deceased, whoever they might be, out of
the residue of his estate in the event of escheat.12 7 More recently, under
the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act of 1975,128 a
dependent, de facto spouse may claim a reasonable amount of maintenance out of the deceased partner's estate, even at the expense of his
"legal" family. 12 9 Since much of our law is derived from English law, the
English treatment of nonmarital relationships and meretricious gifts may
well represent the position which our law will eventually follow.
VI.

Conclusion

Although application of the traditional viewpoint that undue influence is usually a consideration whenever a testator wills property to a
meretricious partner can be avoided today through the use of inter vivos
trusts, pour over wills, ownership of property by joint tenancy, and perhaps even adoption,13 0 not everyone is sophisticated enough to be aware
124 See Torres v. Roldan, 67 P.R.R. 342 (1947) (property rights recognized for meretricious
spouses upon termination of relationship); Labor-Social Security Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 687
(1984) (chauffeur's death benefits); Workmen's Accident Compensation Act, P.R. Laws ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3 para. 5 (1977); Automobile Accident Social Protection Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, § 2052(3)
(1978); Urban Renewal Act, P.R. R. & REGS. tit. 17, § 22a-9(a)(1) (1971) (public housing benefits).
125 Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P.D. 81, 82 (1885).
126 15 Geo. 5, ch. 23.
127 Id. at § 46.
128 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents), Act 1975, ch. 63.
129 Id. at § l(e); M. GLENDON, STATE, LAw, AND FAMILY 97 (1977); In re Estate of McC., 9 FAM. 26
(1979). See also Watson v. Lucas, 3 All E.R. 647, 649-52 (1980). Ontario, Canada, also mandates
that a deceased provide adequate support for his common law spouse and "dependents" upon his
death. See Succession Law Reform, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 488, §§ 57, 58 (1980).
130 Proceedings to adopt meretricious partners as legal heirs have not always been successful.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984);
Stevens v. Halstead, 181 A.D. 198, 168 N.Y.S. 142 (1917); In re Jones, 122 R.I. 716, 411 A.2d 910
(1980). But see Green v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S.W. 896 (1927); In re Adult Anonymous II, 88
A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982); In re Adoption of Russell, 170 Pa. Super. 358, 85 A.2d 878
(1952). See also Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
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of the alternate choices of property disposition, or can afford to hire a
lawyer for legal advice. Moreover, the moral climate of the times may
inevitably play a role in such cases,13 ' no matter how careful courts try to
be in downplaying their own prejudices. In any case, contemporary lifestyles necessitate the adoption of a new judicial attitude towards meretricious gifts, in order to incorporate the many changes which the law has
already made in dealing with meretricious relationships. Only through
such a change in attitude can the freedom of testation become the central
focal point whenever one disposes of property by will to a meretricious
partner.

131 Perceptions of morality have sometimes figured predominately in cases involving other aspects of mental capacity as well. For example, whether the testator is suffering from an insane delusion at the time he executes his will may depend on the mores of society at the time. See, e.g., In re
Strittmater's Estate, 140 NJ. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947).

